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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE-POWER OF STATE To
TAX FOREIGN IMPORTS SUPPLYING CURRENT OPERATING NEEDS-Appellant
imported from five countries iron ore which was stored at its processing
plant and drawn upon to fill the current operational needs of the plant.
When the ore arrived it was originally stored in stock piles containing a
three-month supply. As needed, ores were conveyed from the stock piles to
"stock bins," holding one or two days' supply and located in close proximity
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to the plant, from which the ores were used in the operation of the plant.
The State of Ohio collected a personal property tax upon all the imported
ore. In a companion case petitioner imported from Canada lumber and
wood veneers which were stored at its manufacturing plant in their original
packages and similarly drawn upon to fill the daily needs of the plant. The
City of Algoma, Wisconsin, collected a general property tax upon the
stored lumber and veneers. Both appellant and petitioner challenged the
taxes, contending their imported materials were immune from state taxation under the clause of the Constitution which prohibits a state from
taxing "imports." The supreme court of each state sustained the respective
taxes on the ground that the goods were no longer imports when the tax
attached and thus not protected by the federal immunity. On appeal and
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed, two justices
dissenting.1 When material is imported for manufacture and indiscriminate
portions of it are being used to supply the current operating needs of a
processing plant, the whole of such material is subject to state property
taxation even though still in its original packages. Youngstown Sheet and
Tube Co. v. Bowers; United States Plywood Corp. v. City of Algoma, 358
U.S. 534 (1959).
The import-export clause of the Constitution prohibits any state without the consent of Congress from laying "Imposts or Duties on Imports or
Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws...." 2 In Brown v. Maryland 3 Chief Justice Marshall interpreted
this clause to prohibit state taxation of foreign imports until the goods had
been sold, or used, or the original package in which they were imported
had been broken.4 When imported goods are stored in their original packages awaiting manufacture, they will enjoy immunity for the same reason
that imports prior to sale are immune: 6 while remaining the property of
the importer in his warehouse, in the original form or package in which
they were imported, they have not yet been incorporated into the mass of
property in the country and still remain distinct as imports.6 But the principal cases modify this rule to the extent that the imported goods supply
the "current operational needs" of the importing manufacturer. Immunity
then ceases because the imports have entered the manufacturing process.7
The language of this decision is indicative of an increasing awareness by the

1 Justices Frankfurter and Harlan dissented. Justice Stewart took no part in the
consideration or decision of these cases.
2 U.S. CONST., art. I, §10. For a historical discussion of this clause, see Woodruff v.
Parham, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 123 at 133-136 (1868).
a 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 419 (1827).
4 Id. at 441-442. See comment, 58 HARv. L. REv. 858 at 863 (1945); 89 L. Ed. 1279
(1945).
5 Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945).
6 Brown v. Maryland, note 3 supra, at 441.
7 Principal case at 549.
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Supreme Court that import immunity is not an end in itself but must be
applied with due regard for the state taxing power and the purposes which
the import-export clause seeks to achieve. 8
It is significant that the Constitution prohibits only "Imposts or Duties"
on imports and e:x:ports, for a persuasive argument can be made that a state
ad valorem property tax does not fall within this prohibition. A property
tax is- not a tax on imports as such and therefore would still leave the importing process free of state control as the Constitution requires.9 Moreover,
as one writer has indicated, a property tax is usually regarded as the "quid
pro· quo" for police and fire protection of goods located in the state, and
there is no reason to think the Constitution would require that imported
goods obtain these benefits at the expense of other property subject to tax
by the state. 10 While the Court in the principal cases did not hold that
state property taxes can reach "imports," it did move significantly in this
direction by narrowing the scope of goods classified as "imports." It has long
been held that goods which have entered the process of manufacture lose
their import immunity.11 As the dissent in the principal cases points out,
this was generally represented by a physical transformation of the imported
goods, which is lacking here.12 It would seem, however, that this is purely
an arbitrary distinction which, while usually present, bears no logical relation to the time when the state's taxing power should attach. Surely if an
import sold in its original package without any physical transformation can
be said to have become subject to_ the taxing power of the state, no good

s Compare the language of the Court in the principal case at 545, where the problem
is said to be the practical one "of reconciling the competing demands of constitutional
immunity of imports and of the State's power to tax property within its borders," with
that in Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 29 at 34 (1872), where the Court emphasized
the absolute prohibition by the Constitution of "any" tax on imports. The principal
case seems to indicate a tendency to balance the state and federal interests in this area
in much the same manner as under the commerce clause. Cf. Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959), note, 57 .MICH. L. REv. 903 (1959). But see
Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 at 75-76 (1946). Some
writers have previously called for a re-examination of Chief Justice Marshall's analysis
of import immunity. See Trickett, "The Original Package Ineptitude," 6 COL. L. R.Ev.
161 at 174 (1906); Foster, "What Is Left of the Original Package Doctrine," 1 SOL. L.Q.
303 at 307-312 (1916).
9 This argument was raised in Low v. Austin, note 8 supra, at 34, but rejected by
a unanimous court on the ground that the Constitution prohibits all state imposts or
duties on imports, and not just discriminatory taxes. Cf. Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S.
622 (1885).
10 See comment, 58 HARV. L. R.Ev. 858 at 867 (1945). In the principal case the discrimination which would result in favor of imports over similar goods which were nonimports was given as a reason for denying immunity. Prior to this case such discrimination was accepted as implicit in the Constitution. Hooven &: Allison Co. v. Evatt, note
5 supra, at 667. This reversal further illustrates the apparent desire of the present Court
to look at all the interests involved in the import immunity area.
11 Gulf Fisheries Co. v. Madnerney, 276 U.S. 124 (1928).
12 Principztl case, dissenting opinion at 572-573.
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reason exists for engrafting such limitation upon goods entering the manufacturing process.13
The principal .cases do raise the interesting problem of how an importer
can determine whether goods which are imported for use in his manufacturing process will enjoy immunity from state taxation. The existence of
"original packages" here was deemed immaterial. 14 Nor did the Court consider as controlling the exact distance of the imports from the place of
fabrication or the size of the piles of stored imports.15 Instead, the decision
was based on the fact that the total of the imports were being "used" to
supply the current operating needs of the manufacturer.16 In the Youngstown case the total of the imported ore used in this manner included only
a three-month supply, although this represented all such ore stored at the
manufacturing plant.17 Thus, the position which the Court might be expected to take in the future in this area is to allow state taxation whenever
imported materials come to rest at the place of manufacture to be used in
the normal operation of the business.18 It is only after this point has been
reached that the imports can reasonably be said to supply the "current operational needs" of the manufacturer.
Stevan Uzelac

13 The only merit which might -be found in using the "physical transformation" test
to determine when a state might tax goods imported for manufacture is its relative
certainty. But because such test is wholly arbitrary in its application it does not offer
a satisfactory solution in reconciling the competing demands of the state and federal
governments.
14 Principal case at 548-549.
15 Id. at 546-547.
16 Id. at 549.
11 Id. at 537.
18 A tax at this point can also be supported on the ground that the "import stream"
has ended, by way of analogy to the "export stream" theory which controls the state
taxation of exports. See Empresa Siderurgica v. Merced County, 337 U.S. 154 (1949);
comment, 47 CoL. L. R.Ev. 490 at 494-495 (1947).

